This is interesting intellectually. However, what I've learned experientially over half a century is that the "illusory pairs of opposites" (as the Buddhists call them) often point to something larger that contains them both and that lies in the reality that is beyond the horizons of conceptual thinking.
Metathesizing the first two words of the last sentence in this post yields "Might you be a Platonist?" In my case I think only if ur-Platonism is diluted to meaning that I think there is a realm of being that transcends our capacity for understanding. Any attempt to use what is to explain what is inevitably prompts a case of what James called "the ontological wonder sickness," which clearly dovetails with the existential ache you describe in your books. But attempts to infer a Reality that can be posited but not known on the basis of what exists is an attempt to cure the ontological wonder sickness, for which there is no cure: "Metathesizing" what is to explain what is is a fool's errand. I am a Platonist only if the minimalist sense of thinking one can coherently posit a Reality beyond the spaciotemporal existence we can know counts. As Thomas said, we need revelation because of the weakness of the human intellect relative to the task of understanding God [reply to the question that opens the Summa Theologica[, which I take to mean the Reality that can be posited beyond the existence we can know.
Hi Owen. Thanks for the good question. The short answer to your question is that I'm a bigger fan of Thomas's self-critique at the end of his life when he stated to Reginold (sp?) that "...all that I have written seems as straw" in comparison with the mystical experience that caused his mental breakdown. A slightly longer explanation is that I like the Platonic dialogs in which Socrates deconstructs every idea that is proposed, but find the doctrinaire dialogs--The Republic mostly--revoltingly claustrophobic. And the wider context that I place my thought in is Augustine's rejection of any capacity to understand eternal truths from our contingent, temporal point of view. The last is probably programed into my thought processes by my Lutheran upbringing. But that makes me an iconoclast by second nature, right?
This is interesting intellectually. However, what I've learned experientially over half a century is that the "illusory pairs of opposites" (as the Buddhists call them) often point to something larger that contains them both and that lies in the reality that is beyond the horizons of conceptual thinking.
Metathesizing the first two words of the last sentence in this post yields "Might you be a Platonist?" In my case I think only if ur-Platonism is diluted to meaning that I think there is a realm of being that transcends our capacity for understanding. Any attempt to use what is to explain what is inevitably prompts a case of what James called "the ontological wonder sickness," which clearly dovetails with the existential ache you describe in your books. But attempts to infer a Reality that can be posited but not known on the basis of what exists is an attempt to cure the ontological wonder sickness, for which there is no cure: "Metathesizing" what is to explain what is is a fool's errand. I am a Platonist only if the minimalist sense of thinking one can coherently posit a Reality beyond the spaciotemporal existence we can know counts. As Thomas said, we need revelation because of the weakness of the human intellect relative to the task of understanding God [reply to the question that opens the Summa Theologica[, which I take to mean the Reality that can be posited beyond the existence we can know.
Have you read Plato? If you read and agree with Aquinas you're probably a Platonist.
Hi Owen. Thanks for the good question. The short answer to your question is that I'm a bigger fan of Thomas's self-critique at the end of his life when he stated to Reginold (sp?) that "...all that I have written seems as straw" in comparison with the mystical experience that caused his mental breakdown. A slightly longer explanation is that I like the Platonic dialogs in which Socrates deconstructs every idea that is proposed, but find the doctrinaire dialogs--The Republic mostly--revoltingly claustrophobic. And the wider context that I place my thought in is Augustine's rejection of any capacity to understand eternal truths from our contingent, temporal point of view. The last is probably programed into my thought processes by my Lutheran upbringing. But that makes me an iconoclast by second nature, right?
This is...surprising. But I'm engaging with this series so far.